ILLICIT DIAMONDS: AFRICA’S CURSE
[+ Russian version]
By Rasna WARAH*
Just as the
history of Arab States is intimately tied to the discovery of oil in the
region, the discovery of diamonds in Africa has not only impacted the
continent’s history, but has been one of the leading causes of conflict.
The link between diamonds and
conflict in Africa and the role of international players in the illicit
diamond trade were recently discussed at a seminar in Nairobi, Kenya,
on resource-based conflicts organized by the Society for International
Development’s East Africa Chapter. It is interesting to note that Africa’s
most conflict-ridden countries–Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo–are also the most diamond-rich countries on the
continent, as well as the most poor and under-developed. Conflict or “blood”
diamonds have fuelled wars and led to the massive displacement of civilian
populations in many African nations. While conflict diamonds represent
a small proportion of the overall diamond trade, illicit diamonds constitute
as much as 20 per cent of the annual world production. The level of illegality
gives an opportunity and a space for conflict diamonds.
The link between diamonds, poverty
and conflict is evident in countries such as Sierra Leone, where the rich
alluvial diamond fields of the Kono District and Tongo Field were among
the most prized targets of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In 2000,
Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) published a report entitled “The Heart
of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security”, which placed
much of the blame for the civil war in the country on diamonds, describing
them as “small bits of carbon that have no intrinsic value in themselves,
and no value whatsoever to the average Sierra Leonean beyond their attraction
to foreigners”.
The report recounts the corrupting
of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry, from peak exports of 2 million carats
a year in the 1960s to less than 50,000 carats by 1998. The country’s
despotic President during much of this time, Siaka Stevens, had tacitly
encouraged illicit mining by becoming involved in criminal or near-criminal
activities himself. When the RUF began waging a war in 1991, Liberian
leader Charles Taylor acted as mentor, trainer, banker and weapons supplier
for the movement. The RUF also took on the role of diamond supplier to
the illicit international trade. “It is ironic”, says the report, “that
enormous profits have been made from diamonds throughout the conflict,
but the only effect on the citizens of the country where they were mined
has been terror, murder, dismemberment and poverty”.
The PAC report supports the
idea that there was virtually no oversight of the international movement
of diamonds. In the 1990s, for instance, billions of dollars worth of
diamonds was imported into Belgium from Liberia, even though the latter
produces very few diamonds. This can only be explained by the fact that
big and small companies were colluding in the laundering of diamonds in
West Africa, using Liberia as the conduit country. Much of the laundering
was done by local Lebanese traders who have been living in West Africa
for over a century.
Lebanese immigrants began arriving
in West Africa as refugees fleeing the hardship caused by the silk-worm
crisis which struck Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century. Among the earliest
recipients of those immigrants were Senegal and Sierra Leone, then under
European colonial rule. According to Lansana Gberie, a researcher who
has written about the Lebanese connection in Sierra Leone’s diamond trade,
since the 1950s, “diamonds have been the linchpin of Lebanese business
and a range of subterranean political activities”.
In her paper, “War and Peace
in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection”, published
by the Diamonds and Human Security Project in 2002, Gberie describes the
beginnings of the Lebanese trade in diamonds: “Diamonds were discovered
in Kono District, in eastern Sierra Leone in 1930, and that same year,
as word of the discovery spread, the first Lebanese trader arrived in
Kono and set up shop, ahead of colonial officials who did not want to
establish a district office there until two years later. They were also
ahead of the British-owned Sierra Leone Selection Trust, which was granted
exclusive diamond mining and prospecting rights for the entire country
in 1935. From that time until 1956, when an alluvial diamond mining scheme
was enacted, it was illegal for anyone not working for the Trust to deal
in any way with diamonds. However, illicit mining activities were rampant,
with many Lebanese subsequently settling in Kono and funding Africans
to mine and sell their finds to them.”
In the 1950s, the illicit diamond
mining and smuggling increased dramatically, and it was estimated that
20 per cent of all diamonds reaching the world’s diamond markets were
smuggled from Sierra Leone, largely through Liberia and mainly by Lebanese
and Mandingo traders. In later years, civil war often revolved around
the control of this illicit trade. In 2002, a UN Expert Panel reported
that the then “interim” leader of the RUF, Issa Sesay, had flown to Abidjan
late in 2001 with 8,000 carats of diamonds that he had sold to two traders
of undisclosed identity, who were apparently using a Lebanese businessman
to run errands for them between Abidjan and the Liberian capital, Monrovia.
Some reports suggest that the UN peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone may
have also become involved in the RUF illicit diamond trading.
In 2001, shortly after the 11
September attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the Washington Post
found another link in this most secretive and highly lucrative trade—that
of international terrorists. In an article published on 2 November 2001,
war correspondent Douglas Farah stated that the Al Qaeda network “reaped
millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of diamonds
mined by rebels in Sierra Leone” and that three senior Al Qaeda operatives
had visited Sierra Leone at different times in 1998 and later. He further
claimed that the West African Shi’ite Lebanese community was sympathetic
to Hezbollah and often served as a link between the RUF rebels and Al
Qaeda. However, according to Gberie, much of the evidence linking West
Africa’s Lebanese community to global terror networks is largely “anecdotal
and circumstantial”.
In the last few years, however,
the illicit diamond trade has come under scrutiny from many quarters,
which makes it much more difficult for middlemen and smugglers to operate.
Since 1999, PAC has undertaken a programme of policy research, education
and advocacy to ensure that the international diamond industry operates
legally, openly and for the primary benefit of the countries where the
diamonds originate. It has also extensively published reports that have
uncovered the secret dealings and James Bond-style manoeuvres of the middlemen
and smugglers in the industry who operate often with the full knowledge
and approval of Governments (or rebel movements), and act as conduits
for diamonds smuggled from neighbouring countries.
In May 2000, an international certification process for rough diamonds,
known as the Kimberley Process, was initiated by the Government of South
Africa. Concerned about how diamond-fuelled wars in Angola, Sierra Leone
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo might affect the legitimate trade
in other diamond-producing countries, more than 35 nations have been meeting
on a regular basis to develop the system, which was established in 2003.
In Sierra Leone, the diamond
certification system was instituted in October 2000, four months after
the UN Security Council passed a resolution that banned diamond exports
until a certification system was set up. In the twelve months after the
system was introduced, legal exports rose from $1.3 million to $25.9 million
worth of diamonds. However, PAC believes that many of the better quality
diamonds are still being smuggled and are not going through the official
certification system. In other words, the illicit diamond trade continues
to operate through informal agreements that are sealed with a nod, a wink
and no paper trail.
Quote:
“Ours was not a civil war.
It was not a war based on ideology,
religion or ethnicity, nor was it a ‘class war’.
… It was a war of proxy aimed
at permanent rebel control of our rich diamond fields, for the benefit
of outsiders.”
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah,
President of Sierra Leone
* BIO
Rasna Warah, a freelance writer based in Nairobi, is a Board member of
the East Africa Chapter of the Society for International Development
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